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Abstract. Most previous works study the evolution of cooperation in a structured
population by commonly employing an isolated single network. However, realistic
systems are composed of many interdependent networks coupled with each other,
rather than the isolated single one. In this paper, we consider a system including two
interacting networks with the same size, entangled with each other by the introduction
of probabilistic interconnections. We introduce the public goods game into such
system, and study how the probabilistic interconnection influences the evolution
of cooperation of the whole system and the coupling effect between two layers of
interdependent networks. Simulation results show that there exists an intermediate
region of interconnection probability leading to the maximum cooperation level in the
whole system. Interestingly, we find that at the optimal interconnection probability the
fraction of internal links between cooperators in two layers is maximal. Also, even if
initially there are no cooperators in one layer of interdependent networks, cooperation
can still be promoted by probabilistic interconnection, and the cooperation levels in
both layers can more easily reach an agreement at the intermediate interconnection
probability. Our results may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior
in some realistic interdependent networks and thus highlight the importance of
probabilistic interconnection on the evolution of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
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1. Introduction
The emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals in real world is still a challenging
problem in social and biological systems [1]. Evolutionary game theory has provided
a uniform framework to improve our understanding of the emergence and sustenance
of cooperation among unrelated individuals [2, 3, 4]. The public goods game (PGG),
as one of the most famous paradigms, is often used for discussing the conflict between
individuals and common interests [5].
In a typical PGG, cooperators (C) contribute an amount c to the public good
and defectors (D) do not contribute. The total contribution is multiplied by an
enhancement factor r (r > 1) and then equally distributed by all the members in
the group. Therefore, Ds obtain the same benefit of Cs with no cost, which confronts
the individuals with the temptation to defect by taking advantage of the public good
without contribution. Correspondingly, the Tragedy of the Commons is induced. In
order to elucidate why cooperators thrive under the exploitation of defectors in PGG,
many mechanisms have been proposed, such as voluntary participation [6, 7], social
diversity [8, 9, 10, 11], punishment [12, 13, 14, 15], migration [16, 17], reward [18, 19],
coordinated investments [20], the Matthew effect [21], adaptive and bounded investment
returns [22], and conditional strategies [23]. In particular, the evolution of cooperation
in the PGG on complex networks receives more attention recently. It is shown that the
mesoscale structure plays an important role in promoting the evolution of cooperation
on complex networks [24, 25].
It is worth pointing out that all the previous works enumerated above are based on
the limited case of an isolated single complex network, e.g., square lattice, regular ring,
or scale-free network. However, empirical evidences show that real world systems are
not isolated or disintegrated, but constructed by lots of interdependent networks, which
connect and influence one another directly or indirectly [26]. In other words, the real
world in which we are living is a huge network of networks [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Especially
in the social environment, there exists a diverse kinds of related social networks, such
as the collaboration network and the social network. It is known that, because of the
social attribute of human beings, these two networks are directly linked together to some
degree for scientists [32]. Each individual on one layer of networks may probably link
with the corresponding individual on the other one. In this situation, the two layers
may entangle with each other to different degrees. In particular, this relationship can
be described by the probabilistic interconnection between them. Thus, it is interesting
to study the social dynamics on the realistic system constructed by at least two layers
of interdependent networks with probabilistic interconnection, and far less attention has
been paid on the evolution of cooperation in this type of system. Moreover, we would like
to distinguish the interdependent networks from community structure and hierarchical
network by network structure and social implication. From the network structure, in
a community structure, the connections are tight in communities but sparse between
them [33, 34]. In a hierarchical network, small groups of nodes organize in a hierarchical
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Figure 1. Interdependent networks composed of two layers A (denoted by red nodes)
and B (denoted by blue nodes). Individuals are arranged on two square lattices of the
same population size. Under the probabilistic interconnection, a fraction of nodes in
layer A are connected with the corresponding nodes in layer B. Here, a node from one
layer can connect at most one node from the other layer.
manner into increasingly large groups, while maintaining a scale-free topology [35].
However, in interdependent networks, the interacting layers are connected through intra-
layer links, which are independent of the interacting networks and can be tight or sparse
in different situations. The probabilistic interconnection between the interconnected
layers determines the coupling effect between them [36]. From the social implication,
the communities in a community structure probably share common properties and play
similar roles [37]. They can interact with the others to complete one overall functionality.
While in a hierarchical network, the individual in the center of bigger cluster means being
at higher level in the hierarchy [38]. However, the layers of interdependent networks may
have different properties or roles. They interact with each other, influence each other
and complement each other [39]. Remarkably, recently Wang et al studied the impact
of biased utility functions on interdependent networks which were connected by utility
functions [40]. They showed that the benefits of enhanced public cooperation on the
interdependent networks are as biased as the utility functions. They emphasized that the
positive effect of biased utility functions is due to the suppressed feedbacks of individual
success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic time scales of the
evolutionary process on interdependent networks. However, we would like to point out
that interacting layers in their work are only coupled by the utility functions, and indeed
they may be also connected by probabilistic interconnection.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of interdependent networks including two
interacting layers connected through probabilistic interconnection to study the evolution
of cooperation on them and the coupling effect between them. For simplicity, we employ
two identical spatial structures A and B of the same size. Moreover, we assume that
each node in A connects the corresponding node in B with probability p. Here the
interconnection probability p, which controls the number of links between A and B,
represents the integration of two interconnected layers. For p = 0, there are no internal
links between the two layers. In other words, A and B are totally separated. In the
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opposite limit, that is, p = 1, all the nodes in A and B are completely connected in
order. For 0 < p < 1, the actual number of internal links between A and B is subject
to a binomial distribution. We find that there exists an optimal intermediate region of
the interconnection probability p maximizing the cooperation level in the whole system.
Surprisingly, even if initially there are no cooperators in one layer of interdependent
networks, by means of the coupling effect between them, the cooperation level on both
layers can more easily reach an agreement at an intermediate interconnection probability.
2. Model
We investigate the evolutionary PGG on two interacting layers A and B, as shown in
figure 1. In order to focus explicitly on the impact of the probabilistic interconnection
and easily compare our results with previous works, the two layers of interdependent
networks we employed are both L×L square lattices with periodic boundary conditions
and von Neumann neighborhoods. They have the same population size, NA = NB.
Each node in A connects the corresponding node in B with probability p. Meanwhile,
we assume that a node from one layer connects to no more than one node from the other
layer.
Initially, individuals in the system are designated either as a cooperator or a defector
with equal probability. Depending on the local links between individuals and the internal
links between two interacting layers, individuals not only engage in five local PGGs
which are centered on himself and the nearest neighbors on the same layer, may but
also engage in one long-range PGG which is centered on the corresponding node on
the other layer. In addition, cooperators contribute c = 1 to every PGG involved,
and defectors contribute nothing. The total contribution is subsequently multiplied
by the enhancement factor r, and then shared equally by all of the group members
irrespective of their strategies. The results obtained below are from the renormalized
PGG enhancement factor η = r/(M + 1+ p) [6, 9, 20, 41], where M = 4 is the number
of local nearest neighbors of focal individuals. The payoff of defectors engaging in one
PGG is Pd = r · nc/(M + 1+ p) = η · nc, and the corresponding payoff of cooperators is
then Pc = Pd−1, where nc is the number of cooperators in the group. After engaging in
all the groups, player x is allowed to learn from a randomly selected neighbor y including
the long-range one. To be specific, player x adopts the strategy of the random neighbor
y with a probability determined by the difference of their payoffs
W(x←y) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ]
, (1)
where κ denotes the noise effect in the strategy adoption process [42]. Following previous
study [43], we simply set κ = 0.5 in this work, and mainly focus on the impact of
probabilistic interconnection.
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Figure 2. The frequencies of cooperators among interdependent networks as a
function of normalized enhancement factor η with different values of p in (a) and
as a function of interconnection probability p with different values of η in (b).
3. Simulation and analysis
In the following, we show the simulation results carried out on the interdependent
networks composed of two interacting layers both of size 100 × 100. It is known that
network size can strongly influence the dynamics of such system [44]. Thus, we have also
conformed our model in different systems of larger network size, e.g., 200 × 200. The
simulation indicates that our results are robust in larger systems. Initially, cooperators
and defectors are randomly distributed on both layers of interdependent networks with
equal probability. We define that ρac denotes the frequency of cooperators of A, and ρbc
the frequency of cooperators of B correspondingly. Meanwhile, we define that ρc denotes
the frequency of cooperators in the whole system. In our work, we adopt the synchronous
Monte Carlo simulation procedure to update the strategies of players. Unless otherwise
stated, all the simulation results shown below are required up to 3×104 generations and
then sampled by another 103 generations. The results are averaged over 30 realizations
of different initial conditions.
We first plot the frequency of cooperators in the whole system as a function of the
renormalized enhancement factor η for different values of p in figure 2(a). For p = 0.5,
we find that the cooperation level is enhanced obviously on a large scale of η and the full
cooperation state is achieved at η = 0.92. While p = 0, we note that the full cooperation
state is achieved at η = 1.04, which falls behind p = 0.5. For p = 0.9, at the same values
of η, the cooperation level is higher than that of p = 0 but lower than that of p = 0.5,
and the full cooperation state is achieved at η = 0.98. We note that, as shown in figure
2(a), the probabilistic interconnection between two interacting layers can significantly
influence the evolution of cooperation in the whole system. In order to study the role
of probabilistic interconnection in promoting cooperation intensively, we investigate the
frequencies of cooperators as a function of p with different η in figure 2(b). We observe
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Figure 3. The complete p−η phase diagram for PGG on the interdependent networks.
The upper (lower) boundary is the extinction thresholds of cooperators (defectors)
correspondingly.
that, for each fixed η, there exists an optimal intermediate region of p maximizing
the cooperation level in the whole system. The probabilistic interconnection promoting
cooperation resembles an interesting resonancelike phenomenon reflected by the optimal
cooperation level at the intermediate interconnection probability. Additionally, we find
that, for each fixed η, the cooperation level in the whole system ρc at p = 1.0 is larger
than that at p = 0. In addition, we would like to point out that it is difficult to use
theoretical analysis, e.g. pair-approximation method, to investigate the cooperation
level in this system. However, these simulation results presented in figure 2 clearly
evidence that the introduction of probabilistic interconnection between interdependent
networks significantly influences the evolution of cooperation on them and there exists
some intermediate values of p maximizing the cooperation level in the whole system.
In figure 3, we draw the full p−η phase diagram for the evolution of cooperation on
the interdependent networks. It is worth noting that, for each value of p, there exists a
lower critical value and an upper critical value for η respectively. Below the lower critical
value, defectors dominate the whole population; while above the upper critical value,
cooperators dominate the whole population. We observe that for intermediate p, both
the upper and lower boundaries attain their minimum values, where the coupling effect
between interdependent networks is the strongest. Clearly, the upper critical value of
η first monotonously decreases until reaching the minimal value at about p = 0.5, then
increases with increasing p. This result further indicates that the impact of the effective
interaction topology induced by the probabilistic interconnection reaches the strongest
at intermediate p.
In order to intensively investigate the coupling effect induced by probabilistic
interconnection, we calculate the frequencies of CC links between the interacting layers
at equilibrium with different η in figure 4. Interestingly, we find that the frequencies of
CC links with different η between two layers are pretty similar with that of cooperators
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Figure 4. The frequencies of CC links between two interacting layers as a function
of the probabilistic interconnection p with different η.
in the whole system shown in figure 2(b) for corresponding values of η. This phenomenon
indicates that the coupling effect due to the probabilistic interconnection between
interdependent networks fundamentally influences the cooperation level in the whole
system. To describe the strategy relationship between two interacting layers, especially
to describe the assortment of CC links between them quantitatively, we employ the
correlation coefficient between individuals [45]
rc =
E(SiSj)− E(Si)E(Sj)√
E(S2i − E(Si)
2)
√
E(S2j − E(Sj)
2)
, (2)
where Si and Sj are the strategies of a random pair of connected individuals i and j.
If i is a C, Si = 1. Otherwise, Si = 0. E(·) is the expected value of corresponding
strategy. In an infinite system, we approximately consider a simplified correlation
coefficient rc = (ρCC − ρ
2
c)/(ρc− ρ
2
c), where ρCC is the fraction of CC links between two
layers. We calculate that rc > 0 with different η, when 0 < ρc < 1. It means that there
exists strong positive strategy relationship between two layers. Thus, the probabilistic
interconnection which fundamentally determines the evolution of cooperation in spatial
public goods game strengthens the coupling effect between interdependent networks.
To understand this coupling effect intuitively, in the following we present some
snapshots of the numerical simulation results of both A and B at stationary state for
fixed η = 0.9 and three different values of p, as shown in figure 5. It can be observed
that, for intermediate p = 0.5, cooperators can dominate defectors in both A and
B. Whereas for small p = 0 or large p = 1.0, cooperators can only coexist with
defectors in the long run. These snapshots demonstrate that, at intermediate p, the
cooperation level in A and B is respectively higher than ones for other values of p, thus
the fraction of cooperators in the whole population is highest at these intermediate p
values. Moreover, for different values of p, the cooperation level in A is similar to that
in B. And similar spatial patterns simultaneously display in A and B especially for
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Figure 5. Snapshots of the typical distributions of cooperators (black) and defectors
(white) on A (a-c) and B (d-f) obtained by η = 0.9 and different values of p. These
snapshots are a 50× 50 portion of the full 100× 100 lattices. (a) p = 0 (ρac = 0.7024),
(b) p = 0.5 (ρac = 0.9744), (c) p = 1.0 (ρac = 0.768), (d) p = 0 (ρbc = 0.736), (e)
p = 0.5 (ρbc = 0.9704) and (f) p = 1.0 (ρbc = 0.7648).
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Figure 6. Simultaneous time evolution of cooperation level on A (ρac) and B (ρbc)
for η = 0.9. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed on A with
equal probability, but the individuals on B are all defectors.
intermediate p, which indicates the strong coupling effect exhibit between these two
interacting layers of interdependent networks.
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Finally, to further explore the coupling effect induced by probabilistic
interconnection between A and B on the evolution of cooperation, in figure 6 we study
the time evolution of fraction of cooperators in A and B respectively by assuming
that two different initial conditions. Initially, cooperators and defectors are randomly
distributed on A, while only defectors are distributed on B. In figure 6(a), we find that
the cooperation level for different values of p first decreases sharply and then rapidly
increases to the equilibrium state. The fraction of cooperators in B monotonously
increases with time for different values of p, even for very small p = 0.0001. Interestingly,
for each value of p, the final fraction of cooperators in B at equilibrium is similar
to the value in A. Remarkably, the fractions of cooperators in A and B can easily
reach an agreement for intermediate interconnection probability p = 0.5. Also, the
final cooperation levels on both layers for intermediate p are higher than that of the
other values of p. These results imply that the strongest coupling effect between
the two interacting layers emerges at intermediate interconnection probability, which
synchronously promotes the evolution of cooperation in the whole system.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Let us further discuss the differences between our model and some relevant previous
works [38, 40, 46, 47, 48]. In ref. [46], Chen et al studied the evolutionary Prisoner’s
Dilemma game on a community structure network which exhibits scale-free property.
They showed that the cooperation level decreases with the increment of the average
degree and reducing inter-community links can promote cooperation when keeping the
total links unchanged. In ref. [47], Wang et al analytically studied the evolution
of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures. They
demonstrated that cooperation and punishment are more abundant than defection in the
case of sufficiently large community size and number with different imitation strength
between communities. In ref. [38], Vukov and Szabo´ studied how the cooperation level
is affected by the number of hierarchical levels and by the temptation to defect. They
showed that the highest frequency of cooperation can be observed at the top level if
the number of hierarchical levels is low, and for larger number of hierarchical levels, the
highest cooperation level occurs in the middle layers. However, as we described above,
these works are studied in an isolated single network with community or hierarchical
structure which does not fully investigate the complex nature of the real world composed
of interdependent networks [26, 27, 30, 36]. In our study, the interdependent networks
are composed of two interacting layers and the internal links build a bridge between
them. They inspires individuals on different layers to interact with each other and
then influence each other, thereby promoting the evolution of cooperation in the whole
system and enhancing the coupling effects between interdependent networks. It is worth
pointing out that in our work, although the two interconnected lattices are linked directly
by the probabilistic interconnection, it does not affect the nature of our research. Even
if the interaction process and learning process are detached, they can still influence the
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evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the whole system eventually due to the coupling
effects between interdependent networks.
Recently, Go´mez-Garden˜es et al studied the evolutionary game dynamics on
multiplex interdependent networks [48]. In their work, each individual plays with all
the neighbors on different layers of networks and obtain the net payoff of all the payoffs
collected in each of network layers by using a set of strategies. They showed that
the resilience of cooperation for extremely large values of the temptation to defect is
enhanced by the multiplex structure. Furthermore, this resilience is intrinsically related
to a non-trivial organization of cooperation across the network layers, thus providing
a new way out for cooperation to survive in structured populations. However, the
coupling factors among layers of networks are not considered in their work. Whereas
in our study, the introduction of probabilistic interconnection controlled by parameter
p communicates one layer to another, introducing the coupling effects. Moreover, the
interconnection probability p indicates the integration of the two interacting layers of
interdependent networks. Unlike the previous works, the internal links in our work
significantly influence the dynamical behavior in the whole system by the coupling
effects. There resembles an interesting resonancelike phenomenon [49, 50] reflected
by the optimal cooperation level at the intermediate interconnection probability. Also,
introducing appropriate probabilistic interconnection between interdependent networks
can significantly influence the formation process of clusters which determines the
evolution of cooperation in the whole system to a great extent. Interestingly, the
patterns of clusters in both networks are very similar even by the approximate locations
of cooperators and defectors, which presents an even richer resonancelike behavior.
Furthermore, comparing the results of p = 0 with p = 1, we find that the average level of
cooperation when p = 1 is always larger than that of p = 0, thus enforcing the positive
role of probabilistic interconnection between two interacting layers. Therefore, our study
further complements the investigation about coupling effect between interdependent
networks in the framework of evolutionary graph theory, and enriches the knowledge of
evolutionary dynamics in the PGG.
In summary, we have studied the evolution of cooperation on two interacting
layers of interdependent networks coupled by probabilistic interconnection. We have
shown that the introduction of probabilistic interconnection provides a new way of
understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals
in sizable groups. We find that there exists an optimal intermediate region of
p maximizing the cooperation level in the whole system. Importantly, we clearly
evidence that the introduction of probabilistic interconnection between interdependent
networks strengthens the coupling effect between them. Therefore, the probabilistic
interconnection between interacting layers just like a bridge opening the way for the
neighboring networks to interact with each other. By means of this simple model, we
would like to reveal the internal mechanisms about how the evolution of cooperation
thrives in the real world constructed by interdependent networks. Although this model is
simple and does not include every kind of circumstances existing, we hope this beneficial
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attempt can highlight the way of exploring the internal mechanisms in promoting the
evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks which is closer to reality.
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